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1Abstract: The problem of achieving widespread immunity to infectious diseases
by voluntary vaccination is often presented as a public-goods dilemma, as an indi-
vidual’s vaccination contributes to herd immunity, protecting those who forgo vac-
cination. The temptation to free-ride brings the equilibrium vaccination level below
the social optimum. Here we present an evolutionary game-theoretic approach to
this problem, exploring the roles of individual imitation behaviour and population
structure in vaccination. To this end, we integrate an epidemiological process into
a simple agent-based model of adaptive learning, where individuals use anecdotal
evidence to estimate costs and beneﬁts of vaccination. In our simulations, we focus
on parameter values that are realistic for a ﬂu-like infection. Paradoxically, as agents
become more adept at imitating successful strategies, the equilibrium level of vac-
cination falls below the rational individual optimum. In structured populations, the
picture is only somewhat more optimistic: vaccination is widespread over a range of
low vaccination costs, but coverage plummets after cost exceeds a critical threshold.
This result suggests parallels to historical scenarios in which vaccination coverage
provided herd immunity for some time, but then rapidly dropped. Our work sheds
light on how imitation of peers shapes individual vaccination choices in social net-
works.
Key words: vaccination dilemma, peer inﬂuence, epidemiology, evolutionary dy-
namics, mathematical biology
2I. INTRODUCTION 1
Preemptive vaccination is a fundamental strategy for controlling infectious diseases (CDC 2
2009). While there is vigorous debate about the civil liberties implications of mandatory versus 3
voluntary vaccination policies (Colgrave 2006), mounting evidence shows that voluntary vaccina- 4
tion plans fail to protect populations adequately (Basu et al. 2008, Bauch et al. 2003, Bauch & 5
Earn 2004, Bauch 2005, Breban et al. 2007, Cojocaru 2008, Fine & Clarkson 1986, Galvani et 6
al. 2007, Reluga et al. 2006, van Boven et al. 2008, Vardavas et al. 2007). A recent example of 7
this failure is the sharp decline in take-up of the combined measles-mumps-rubella vaccination in 8
Britain soon after administering it to children was made voluntary (Jansen et al. 2003). Because of 9
declining familiarity with the disease and rising fears of vaccine complications, parents hoped to 10
avoid the alleged vaccination health risk to their own children while implicitly relying on enough 11
other children getting vaccinated to provide herd immunity. The “public good” created by herd 12
immunity gives rise to an enduring social dilemma of voluntary vaccination. 13
Classical game theory predicts that, when individuals act in their own interests with perfect 14
knowledge of their infection risk, their vaccination decisions converge toward a Nash equilibrium, 15
at which no individuals could be better oﬀ by unilaterally changing to a diﬀerent strategy (Bauch et 16
al. 2003, Bauch & Earn 2004). Although this equilibrium is the result of each individual following 17
her self-interest, it may lead to suboptimal vaccination coverage for the community (Galvani et al. 18
2007). The collective result of vaccination decisions determines the level of population immunity 19
and thus the severity of an epidemic strain. With increasing levels of vaccination coverage in 20
the community, even the individuals who are unvaccinated are less likely to become infected; 21
therefore, they have less incentive to get the vaccine. This scenario naturally leads to the “free 22
riding” problem that is commonly observed in public goods studies (Hardin 1968). 23
Previous studies of vaccinating dynamics have typically combined a game-theoretic model 24
assuming full rationality and complete information with a model of disease transmission in ei- 25
ther homogeneously mixed populations (Bauch et al. 2003, Bauch & Earn 2004) or random net- 26
works (Perisic & Bauch 2008). In studies where the assumption of rationality is relaxed, determin- 27
istic evolutionary dynamics still recover equilibrium states equivalent to those predicted by models 28
of rational agents (Bauch 2005). It is worth noting that aggregate population models have been pa- 29
rameterized with empirical data to quantitatively predict vaccinating behavior in some cases (Basu 30
et al. 2008, Bauch 2005, Galvani et al. 2007). Here we extend this previous work by accounting 31
3for decision-makers’ social networks and their use of anecdotal information in making vaccina- 32
tion choices. Individuals have incomplete information and tend to rely on salient anecdotes from 33
friends and the media in order to form opinions of disease risk and prevention (Johnson et al. 1983, 34
Palekar et al. 2008, Tversky & Kahneman 1973). The rise to prominence in the British media of 35
isolated cases linking the pertussis vaccine and brain damage triggered a sharp decline in coverage 36
in the late 1970s, demonstrating the power of the anecdote (Bauch 2005, Nicoll et al. 1998). Apart 37
from these prominent cases, each person can encounter diﬀerent anecdotal evidence, depending 38
on her social network (Eames 2009, Perisic & Bauch 2008). Illness of a close friend can impact 39
one’s perception of infection risk and the importance of prevention in far more powerful ways than 40
media reports can (Palekar et al. 2008). 41
Motivated by the above considerations, we propose a simple agent-based model in the spirit 42
of evolutionary game dynamics (Maynard-Smith 1982, Nowak & Sigmund 2004, Nowak 2006a) 43
to study the voluntary vaccination dilemma. In order to make precise predictions, we couple the 44
vaccination dynamics with an epidemiological model, in particular the SIR model, which tracks 45
populations of susceptible, infected, and resistant/vaccinated individuals over time, within a single 46
season or epidemic. Such models have been used, for example, to design clinical trials of vaccines 47
or to predict whether a vaccination program will halt an epidemic before it spreads to much of the 48
population (Diekmann & Heesterbeek 2000, Levin et al. 1999). 49
Our model captures the strategic interaction between vaccinating and free-riding individuals 50
in the following way. Individuals decide whether to vaccinate during a vaccination campaign, 51
before the seasonal epidemic begins. The epidemiological model then determines whether each 52
susceptible (unvaccinated) individual becomes infected at some point during the season. Once the 53
epidemic ends, individuals can revise their vaccination decision for the next season. Such a model 54
is most appropriate for describing infections such as inﬂuenza. Flu vaccines are typically available 55
prior to a predicted outbreak and are eﬀective for only one season due to mutation of pathogens 56
and waning immunity (Breban et al. 2007, Vardavas et al. 2007). 57
II. MODEL & METHODS 58
Considerawell-mixedpopulationofindividualswithavoluntaryvaccinationoption. Wemodel 59
the vaccination dynamics as a two-stage game (as illustrated in ﬁgure 1). The ﬁrst stage is a public 60
vaccination campaign, which occurs before any infection. At this stage, each individual decides 61
4whether or not to vaccinate. Vaccination incurs a cost, V, to the vaccinated individual. For simplic- 62
ity, here we assume that vaccination grants perfect immunity from the seasonal infectious disease. 63
(To account for imperfect vaccination, one may rescale the cost of vaccination by its eﬀectiveness 64
and calculate infection risk based on the eﬀective proportion of the population that is vaccinated.) 65
The total cost of vaccination includes the immediate monetary cost, the opportunity cost of time 66
spent to get the vaccine, and any perceived or actual adverse health eﬀects. In the second stage, 67
the epidemic strain infects an initial number of individuals I0 and then spreads according to SIR 68
dynamics, with per-day transmission rate r and recovery rate g (see the electronic supplemen- 69
tary material, ESM, for model details). The epidemic continues until there are no more newly 70
infected individuals (which occurred in under 200 days for all cases simulated). The ﬁnal size 71
equation (Diekmann & Heesterbeek 2000) gives the infection risk for an inﬁnite population (see 72
ESM for derivations): 73
w(x) =
R(1)
1   x
= 1   e
 R0R(1); (1)
where R(1) is the ﬁnal size of the epidemic (fraction that have been infected at some point in the 74
season), which satisﬁes R(1) = (1   x)(1   e R0R(1)); R0 is the basic reproduction ratio; and x is 75
the fraction of vaccinated individuals. 76
The infection cost I includes health care expenses, lost productivity, and the possibility of pain 77
or mortality. After the epidemic, the individuals with the highest payoﬀs are those who declined 78
vaccination but avoided infection. We call these lucky individuals successful free-riders, as they 79
beneﬁt from others’ vaccination eﬀorts. The game dynamics remain unchanged if we rescale the 80
payoﬀs by deﬁning the relative cost of vaccination c = V
I (0 < c < 1). The values of c appropriate 81
for modeling a particular disease can be estimated from surveys of health opinions, behaviors, and 82
outcomes, as done by, e.g., Galvani et al. (2007), but in general vaccination cost should be low 83
relative to the cost of infection. The Nash equilibrium of this game can be solved by setting the 84
expected cost of vaccination equal to that of non-vaccination, which implies the mixed strategy 85
x
 = 1 +
ln(1   c)
cR0
: (2)
This level of vaccination uptake falls short of the social optimum xh = 1   1
R0, the level which 86
achieves herd immunity (near-elimination of the risk of contacting an infectious individual) and 87
thereby minimizes the sum of all individuals’ costs related to both vaccination and infection (see 88
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ESM). The misalignment between individual and group interests leads to a social dilemma. 89
Here, we relax the assumption of rationality and study this vaccination dilemma from an evolu- 90
tionary perspective. Each season, an individual adopts a pure strategy, which determines whether 91
or not she vaccinates. At the end of the season, each individual decides whether to change her 92
strategy for the next season, depending on her current payoﬀ. Speciﬁcally, individual i randomly 93
chooses individual j from the population as role model. The strategy of a role model with higher 94
payoﬀ is more likely to be imitated. We suppose that the probability that individual i adopts indi- 95
vidual j’s strategy is given by the Fermi function (Blume 1993, Szab´ o & T˝ oke 1998, Traulsen et 96
al. 2007; 2010) 97
f(Pj   Pi) =
1
1 + exp[ (Pj   Pi)]
; (3)
where  denotes the strength of selection (0 <  < 1). 98
This updating dynamic diverges from a fully rational model in two ways. First, individuals ad- 99
just their strategies retrospectively, in response only to the observed payoﬀ outcomes and not the 100
expected payoﬀs of strategies. In a population with low vaccination uptake, many non-vaccinators 101
fall ill, but if individual i happens to choose one of the few successful free-riders as a role model, 102
then she will be more likely to imitate the free-rider’s strategy. Second, the strength of selection 103
parameter introduces a stochastic element to the model: for small  (weak selection), individuals 104
are less responsive to payoﬀ diﬀerences, and an individual with a high payoﬀ may adopt the strat- 105
egy of a less successful role model. Large values of  (strong selection) diminish this stochastic 106
eﬀect, and individuals reliably switch to (or keep) the strategy with the higher observed payoﬀ, 107
even if the payoﬀ diﬀerence is small. Previous work using the same update dynamic has char- 108
acterized agents with high  as being more rational (Szab´ o & T˝ oke 1998). This characterization 109
6is not appropriate in our context, as higher  only increases an agent’s sensitivity to the (perhaps 110
unrepresentative) observed payoﬀ, not the expected payoﬀ. 111
The model presented here can be conveniently extended to structured populations by restricting 112
the neighborhood of individuals whom one can infect or imitate. In addition to the well-mixed 113
case, we simulated populations structured as square lattices, Erd˝ os-R´ enyi random graphs (Erd˝ os 114
& R´ enyi 1959), and Barab´ asi-Albert scale-free networks (Barab´ asi & Albert 1999) (see ESM). 115
The initial state consists of equal fractions vaccinators and unvaccinators, randomly distributed 116
throughout the population. Each two-stage iteration (vaccination strategy updating followed by 117
an epidemic process) updates the frequencies of each strategy. Since we are interested primarily 118
in the eﬀect of population structure on vaccination coverage (rather than on infection risk), we 119
calibrated epidemic parameters to ensure that the infection risk in an unvaccinated population is 120
equal across all population structures (Perisic & Bauch 2008) (see ESM). Each simulation was run 121
for 3,000 iterations. The long run equilibrium results shown in ﬁgures 2–4 represent the average 122
of frequencies over the last 1,000 iterations in 100 independent simulations. We present results of 123
simulations that use population sizes between N = 500 and N = 10;000; overall results are robust 124
to varying population size for N as small as 200. 125
III. RESULTS 126
In the vaccination game, if all of one’s neighbors adopt one strategy, then it is advantageous 127
to adopt the opposite strategy. We therefore always ﬁnd persistent polymorphisms of vaccinated 128
and unvaccinated individuals for intermediate values of c. Figure 2 plots both the equilibrium 129
frequency of (a) vaccinated and (b) infected individuals for diﬀerent values of c and  in the well- 130
mixed imitation dynamics. We ﬁnd qualitative agreement between stochastic simulations and an 131
analytical prediction that uses both the equation for infection risk (1) and an inﬁnite-population 132
approximation of the imitation dynamics (described in ESM). 133
For weak selection ( = 1 in ﬁgure 2), the imitation dynamics approximate the rational equilib- 134
rium x given in equation (2). One can understand this observation analytically by noting that the 135
strategy update equation (3) is roughly linear for small . First-order approximation of the imita- 136
tion dynamics closely approximates the replicator dynamics (Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998, Schuster 137
& Sigmund 1983, Taylor & Jonker 1978), which in this game converge to the unique evolutionarily 138
stable strategy–the Nash equilibrium (see ESM). As vaccination falls with increasing c, the ﬁnal 139
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size of the epidemic grows. Above a high cost threshold cH  0:893, no one chooses vaccination 140
and the epidemic reaches its maximum size. 141
Strong selection in the imitation dynamics (represented by  = 10 in ﬁgure 2) can decrease vac- 142
cination uptake below the level predicted by the rational equilibrium. In other words, individuals 143
who carefully attend to peers’ health outcomes and reliably copy the behavior of successful peers 144
will end up attempting to free-ride more than they rationally “ought” to. If, for example, infection 145
is twelve times as costly as vaccination (namely, c = 0:08, a reasonable assumption for inﬂuenza, 146
see ESM), then strong selection in our model lowers vaccination coverage by 8 percentage points 147
versus weak selection (ﬁgure 2a), which increases the epidemic size from 4% of the population to 148
15% of the population (ﬁgure 2b). With increasing cost of vaccination, the equilibrium vaccina- 149
tion coverage follows a rotated “S” curve, dropping rapidly (slope   

2) from the herd immunity 150
threshold at low values of c, reaching a plateau near 1   2ln2
R0 for intermediate values of c, and 151
then dropping rapidly to zero as c grows large. The threshold cH increases with selection strength 152
(ﬁgure 2a). 153
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Results are qualitatively similar for any basic reproduction ratio R0 > 1 of the infection. Fig- 154
ures S5 and S6 in the ESM compare the cases R0 = 2:5 and R0 = 6. The higher value increases 155
infection risk, making the population respond with increased vaccination uptake. Increasing R0 156
also raises the threshold cH. 157
Restricting interaction to local neighborhoods partly ameliorates the free-riding problem, but 158
introduces greater sensitivity to the cost parameter c (ﬁgure 3). We consider a population of indi- 159
viduals arranged on a square lattice where each individual has four immediately adjacent neigh- 160
bors. While the vaccination coverage in well-mixed populations drops from herd immunity levels 161
9as soon as c increases above zero, restricted spatial interaction promotes near-universal coverage 162
at a range of positive c, preventing the epidemic. To give a simple operational deﬁnition, we say 163
that vaccination “prevents the epidemic” in a structured population if the average ﬁnal epidemic 164
size is less than twice the size of the initial inoculum. Deﬁne as cL the critical vaccination cost 165
below which the epidemic is prevented. For weak selection on the lattice ( = 1 in ﬁgure 3), we get 166
cL  0:022. Above this threshold, the vaccination level drops precipitously, causing an epidemic 167
that is even larger than in the well-mixed case. 168
At higher selection strength, the threshold cL is lower, and vaccination coverage is even more 169
sensitive to costs rising above cL (ﬁgure 3a). The high cost threshold cH rises with selection 170
strength, meaning that the transitional region between cL and cH, where vaccinated and unvacci- 171
nated individuals coexist, widens with larger . Holding c constant at a value above cL, increasing 172
the strength of selection leads to more free-riding attempts, breaking apart clusters of vaccinators, 173
thus allowing a larger epidemic to occur (ﬁgure 3c versus 3d). 174
Most actual populations are heterogeneous in the sense that diﬀerent individuals may have 175
diﬀerent numbers of neighbors (i.e., degree) (Barab´ asi & Albert 1999). To account for this feature, 176
we consider vaccination dynamics on Erd˝ os-R´ enyi random graphs, which have moderate degree 177
heterogeneity; on scale-free networks, which have an even more variable degree distribution, our 178
results are similar (see ESM). 179
Higher vaccination coverage is typically required to achieve herd immunity in populations with 180
greaterdegreeheterogeneity(Pastor-Satorras&Vespignani2002)(seealsoﬁguresS2-S4inESM). 181
This increased vulnerability to epidemic attacks reduces the temptation to free-ride, actually mak- 182
ing it easier for a population of selﬁsh imitators to achieve the high vaccination threshold required 183
for herd immunity. The threshold cost cL therefore increases versus the lattice case. Vaccina- 184
tion coverage drops after cost exceeds this threshold, although the eﬀect is not quite as extreme 185
as in lattice populations (ﬁgures 4a and 4b). Similarly to lattice populations, increased selection 186
strength increases the size of the intermediate region between cL and cH. 187
Degree heterogeneity triggers a broad spectrum of individual vaccinating behavior. Speciﬁ- 188
cally, an individual’s vaccination strategy is now inﬂuenced by her role in the population, and 189
“hubs” who have many neighbors are most likely to choose to be vaccinated, as they are at great- 190
est risk of infection (ﬁgures 4c and 4d). Hubs that do manage to free-ride successfully become 191
victims of their own success, as their vaccinated neighbors of smaller degree are likely to imitate 192
them and switch strategies, potentially infecting the hubs in the following season. 193
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IV. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 194
Our model shows how incomplete information and strong selection (high payoﬀ-sensitivity, pa- 195
rameterized by ) in a population of imitators causes the vaccination coverage to fall well short of 196
the social optimum, and even below the Nash equilibrium. Weak selection in a well-mixed popu- 197
lation recapitulates the replicator dynamics, converging to the Nash equilibrium. Strong selection, 198
on the other hand, drives individuals to imitate successful free-riders based on a single observation, 199
even when a rational agent with complete information would realize that attempted free-riding 200
does poorly in expectation. This “paradox of imitation” is a very general phenomenon (Schlag 201
1998) and may in part explain cases where public vaccination levels are low. In particular, for 202
11the range of vaccination cost appropriate to inﬂuenza (i.e., c  0:002 to 0:08, see ESM), the imita- 203
tion dynamics with strong selection in the well-mixed case falls well short of the rational optimum, 204
leadingtoover-exploitationofherdimmunityandanincreaseinpreventableinfections. Ourmodel 205
describes the admittedly extreme case in which each individual observes only one randomly cho- 206
sen role model each round. Allowing imitators to learn from a somewhat larger group of peers 207
could lessen the sampling error, but would not eliminate it. 208
This kind of error is reminiscent of, but distinct from, the phenomenon of “information cas- 209
cades” that generate rationalized conformism or “groupthink” (Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et 210
al. 1992). Such cascades may also be obstacles to high vaccination coverage (Barton 2009). To 211
explore conformism (or, alternatively, stubbornness) in the context of our model, one might in- 212
clude an additional cost  of switching strategy in the thermal updating rule (Szab´ o & Hauert 213
2002, Traulsen et al. 2010); that is, f(∆P) = 1=[1 + exp((∆P + ))]. A large negative (positive)  214
would then represent the tendency to copy one’s peers (stick with the current strategy), regardless 215
of payoﬀ comparisons. Previous studies have shown in detail how this sort of payoﬀ-neglecting 216
imitation can lead to widespread conformism and adoption of sub-optimal strategies (Banerjee 217
1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992). 218
It is widely known that population structure can promote the evolution of cooperative behav- 219
ior (Hauert & Doebeli 2004, Nowak & May 1992, Nowak 2006b, Nowak et al. 2010, Ohtsuki et 220
al. 2006, Tarnita et al. 2009a;b). We have shown, however, that population structure is a “double- 221
edged sword” for public health: It can promote high levels of voluntary vaccination and herd 222
immunity, but small increases in cost beyond a certain threshold cL cause vaccination to plummet 223
– and infections to rise – more dramatically than in well-mixed populations. For example, the 224
random network population under strong selection ( = 10) can prevent the epidemic completely 225
for costs up to c = 0:04, but 11% of the population become infected at cost c = 0:08. In the 226
well-mixed population, the epidemic grows gradually, from 8% to 15%, over the same cost range. 227
This threshold eﬀect is robust to changes in population structure and exists in lattice (ﬁgures 3a 228
and 3b) and scale-free network (ﬁgures S7a and S7b in ESM) populations as well. 229
In social networks, individuals’ degrees vary greatly, and highly-connected individuals (hubs) 230
can spread disease to a large number of peers if infected. The vaccination of hubs can play a vital 231
role in containing infections (Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani 2002), and public health programs 232
often try to promote herd immunity by allocating vaccinations preferentially to these hubs (Bansal 233
et al. 2006). Physicians who are hubs in a disease-transmission network, for instance, have high 234
12rates of vaccine uptake (Capolongo et al. 2006). Our model shows that even individuals with 235
incomplete information can self-organize to achieve this pro-social outcome (ﬁgure 4). Since 236
hubs generally face greater infection risk than small-degree individuals do, they have increased 237
incentive to vaccinate; hubs’ self-interest is therefore relatively well-aligned with overall welfare. 238
Recent work with a detailed model designed to mimic a smallpox outbreak on a random net- 239
work (Perisic & Bauch 2008) reaches a complementary conclusion about the fragility of high- 240
coverage equilibria: voluntary vaccination can contain a disease in low-degree networks, but as 241
the average degree increases, the system reaches a critical threshold past which it behaves like 242
a well-mixed population and the epidemic spreads. This work focused on vaccination decisions 243
made during the course of an epidemic in response to local disease prevalence, as opposed to 244
season-by-season updating of preemptive vaccination decisions. Taken together, our current work 245
and this previous result demonstrate how local disease transmission and decision-making based on 246
local context change the character of vaccination dynamics. Voluntary vaccination can be a viable 247
policy for achieving high coverage and eradicating disease, but the ﬁnal outcome is sensitive to 248
small changes in (actual or perceived) vaccination cost and in the social network. This sensitivity 249
may in part explain how anecdotal evidence of vaccine-related health risks has been able to trig- 250
ger steep declines in coverage and loss of population immunity (Bauch 2005, Jansen et al. 2003, 251
Nicoll et al. 1998). Policy levers that subsidize vaccination can take advantage of these threshold 252
eﬀects to promote disease containment and eradication. 253
Achieving socially optimal coverage through voluntary vaccination is a problem of cooperation 254
with limited information and uncertainty about outcomes. The problem is similar to public goods 255
games studied by economists (Palfrey & Rosenthal 1984), as herd immunity provides a communal 256
beneﬁt. Individuals’ use of salient anecdotes to cope with uncertainty, however, is not a typically 257
studied feature of public goods games. Two sources of uncertainty face an individual deciding 258
whether to vaccinate: uncertainty about contracting the infection if unvaccinated, and uncertainty 259
regarding adverse reactions to the vaccine itself. Our current work focuses on the former uncer- 260
tainty, treating the vaccine cost as a ﬁxed quantity, which is a summary of all expected costs. It 261
may also be instructive to treat vaccine cost as a random variable, as a way of explicitly modeling 262
public fears concerning vaccine safety. These fears often have a tremendous impact on vaccine 263
take-up and public health (Donald & Muthu 2002, Nicoll et al. 1998). 264
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17Figure legends: 366
Figure 1 Schematic illustration of our model. We model the vaccination dilemma as a two-stage game. At 367
Stage 1 (vaccination choice), a proportion x of the population decides to vaccinate. Vaccination costs 368
V andprovidesperfectimmunityfromtheinfectiousdisease. AtStage2(healthoutcome), weusethe 369
Susceptible-Infected-Recovered model to simulate the epidemiological process. Each unvaccinated 370
individual faces the risk of infection during the seasonal epidemic outbreak. The cost of infection is 371
I. Those unvaccinated individuals who remain healthy are free-riding oﬀ the vaccination eﬀorts of 372
others, and they are indirectly protected by herd immunity. 373
Figure 2 Vaccination dynamics in well-mixed populations. The fractions (a) vaccinated and (b) infected 374
are shown as functions of the relative cost of vaccination, c, for the intensity of selection  = 1 375
and 10. The lines are analytical predictions from deterministic equations (see ESM). The devia- 376
tion between simulation and theory is largely due to stochasticity in disease transmission: holding 377
vaccination constant at some level below the herd immunity threshold (1   1
R0 = 0:6), simulated 378
infection risk is smaller than the prediction in equation (1) (see ﬁgure S1b in ESM). Individuals in 379
the simulation respond to this decreased risk by vaccinating less than in the theory, which in turn 380
leads to a larger epidemic versus the theory. Strong selection magniﬁes individuals’ responses, pro- 381
ducing larger deviations. For vaccination coverage above the theoretical herd immunity level, the 382
deterministic approximation underestimates infection risk, leading to an opposite deviation at low 383
c. Parameters: population size N = 5000, R0 = 2:5 (realized by setting r = 5
6N day 1person 1 and 384
g = 1
3 day 1), number of infection seeds I0 = 5. 385
Figure 3 Vaccination dynamics in lattice populations. Left panels (a), (b) show the fractions vaccinated 386
and infected, respectively, as functions of c for the intensity of selection  = 1 and 10. Right panels 387
(c), (d) show snapshots of the system at equilibrium frequencies with weak and strong selection, 388
respectively. Blue denotes vaccinated individuals, red successful free-riders, and yellow infected 389
individuals. Strong selection breaks apart clusters of vaccinators: 54% of vaccinated individuals’ 390
neighbors are also vaccinated in (c), versus only 49% in (d). Parameters: population size N = 391
100  100 with von Neumann neighborhood, disease transmission rate r = 0:46 day 1person 1, 392
recovery rate g = 1
3 day 1, number of infection seeds I0 = 10, (c)(d) c = 0:08, (c)  = 1, (d)  = 10. 393
The lines in (a) and (b) are visual guides. 394
18Figure 4 Vaccination dynamics in random network populations. Left panels (a), (b) show the fractions 395
vaccinated and infected, respectively, as functions of c for the intensity of selection  = 1 and 10. 396
Right panels: (c) Snapshot of a single simulation on a random network at equilibrium frequencies. 397
The size of a node corresponds to its degree (number of neighbors). Blue nodes are vaccinated, 398
yellow are infected, and red are successful free-riders. (d) The frequency of vaccination on a random 399
network, as a function of the number of neighbors an individual has. The inset in panel (d) shows 400
the degree distribution of the random network. Parameters: (a)-(d) average degree ¯ k = 4, disease 401
transmission rate r = 0:51 day 1person 1, recovery rate g = 1
3 day 1; (a)(b)(d) N = 1000, I0 = 10; 402
(c) N = 500, I0 = 5; (c)(d) c = 0:1,  = 10. The lines in (a) and (b) are visual guides. 403
19